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Wrongful conviction statistics suggest that jurors pay little heed to the quality of confession 
evidence when making verdict decisions.  However, recent research indicates that confession 
inconsistencies may sometimes reduce perception of suspect guilt.  Drawing on theoretical 
frameworks of attribution theory, correspondence bias, and the story model of juror decision-
making, we investigated how judgments about likely guilt are affected by different types of 
inconsistencies: self-contradictions (Experiment 1) and factual errors (Experiment 2). 
Crucially, judgments of likely guilt of the suspect were reduced by factual errors in 
confession evidence, but not by contradictions. Mediation analyses suggest that this effect of 
factual errors on judgments of guilt is underpinned by the extent to which mock-jurors 
generated a plausible, alternative explanation for why the suspect confessed. These results 
indicate that not all confession inconsistencies are treated equally; factual errors might cause 
suspicion about the veracity of the confession, but contradictions do not.  
Keywords: confessions, wrongful conviction, juror decisions, attribution, suspicion 

































































In 1979, six-year-old Etan Patz left home to catch the school bus alone for the first 
time and was never seen again. Although presumed kidnapped and murdered, no physical 
evidence of the crime was ever recovered, with the prosecution case relying on sometimes 
contradictory witness and confession statements.  The man convicted of Etan’s disappearance 
and murder, Pedro Hernandez, was 18 years old at the time of Etan’s disappearance and 
worked at the bodega near the bus stop where Etan was last seen.  Hernandez confessed to 
family and friends in the 1980s that he had done something terrible, and then made further 
confessions to police in 2012 about his involvement in Etan Patz’s disappearance, but 
repeatedly denied murdering him.  Hernandez later retracted those confessions, citing issues 
of mental illness, and pleaded not guilty. After 18 days of jury deliberation, the belief in 
Hernandez’s guilt moved from 50:50 guilty/not guilty, to a final result of 11 jurors rendering 
a guilty verdict, with just one holdout juror unwilling to move from a not guilty verdict.  That 
holdout juror stated that he could not move beyond reasonable doubt due to the bizarre and 
inconsistent confessions that the case relied heavily upon, though stopped short of stating that 
he believed Hernandez to be innocent.  Conversely, another juror stated that it was the quality 
and quantity of Hernandez’s confessions that eventually swayed his verdict to guilty.  
Whether Hernandez’s confessions were true or false, the differences in juror perception of 
confession quality is crucial to understanding why some jurors are willing to convict based on 
inconsistent confession evidence, while others remain skeptical of the confession’s usefulness 
as a piece of evidence when its veracity is in question. As well as real life cases where 
inconsistent confession evidence is questioned by individual jurors, emerging research has 
also shown that some jurors are able to evaluate confession evidence more objectively than 
previously thought (e.g., Palmer, Button, Barnett, & Brewer, 2016; Woestehoff & Meissner, 
2016).  The current research furthers this research by investigating the conditions under 

































































which inconsistencies in confession evidence prompt people to find confessions less 
compelling when making verdict decisions.  
Although an inconsistent confession is no guarantee that the person is innocent, false 
confessions are surprisingly common, despite their counter-intuitive nature.   Statistics show 
that people falsely confess at rates more frequent than common sense might indicate, with  
approximately one quarter of wrongful convictions overturned by DNA evidence attributed at 
least partly to an innocent person falsely confessing their involvement in the crime 
("Innocence Project" 2017).  These numbers highlight two important issues: why people 
falsely confess, and why juries are susceptible to accepting those false confessions. As to why 
people falsely confess, a large body of research has identified interrogation tactics that 
pressure confessions from guilty and innocent suspects alike (e.g. Leo, 2008; Kassin, 2008), 
such as lengthy interrogations (Leo, 2008), and using false evidence (Kassin, 2008). This 
research has led to important recommendations for policies to reduce the likelihood of false 
confessions occurring (e.g. Kassin et al., 2010), though the uptake of the recommendations is 
sometimes slow. For example, by 2018, only 25 US states had implemented the requirement 
for video recording of custodial interrogations (Bang, Stanton, Hemmens, & Stohr, 2018).  
Resistance to procedural change, and the widespread use of pressurised interrogation 
techniques that increase the likelihood of false confessions—such as the Reid technique 
(Kassin, 2008)—suggest that false confessions will continue to occur, and be presented in 
court. Hence, it is crucial to understand how jurors process confession evidence in order to 
determine the conditions under which false confessions are likely to translate to guilty 
verdicts. 
The power of confession evidence
Confessions make for compelling evidence, being described as the most powerful 
piece of courtroom testimony that a prosecutor could present to secure a conviction (Kassin 

































































& Neumann, 1997).  The strength of that confession is such that it can hold almost the entire 
prosecution case, with little corroborating evidence needed (Leo, 2013), and can result in 
otherwise contradictory evidence being glossed over or ignored completely by jurors (Malloy 
& Lamb, 2010).  The persuasive capacity of confessions, and why they hold such power in 
court, relates to beliefs about how and why people confess.  Logically, people believe that a 
person confesses because they are guilty (Henkel et al., 2008; Kassin et al., 2010).  Given the 
negative consequences of confessing to a crime, it can be difficult to imagine a plausible 
reason as to why a person would confess if not guilty. Leo and Ofshe (1998) describe this 
phenomenon as the myth of psychological interrogation: the belief that a person of sound 
mind would not confess to a crime they did not commit, unless physically tortured.  This 
implies that jurors cannot imagine a reason (other than guilt) as to why a suspect would 
confess.   Such jurors would then be susceptible to accepting a confession at face value, and 
attributing variations in confession quality to reasons other than a lack of complicity in the 
crime.  This notion is supported by the results of studies showing that jurors are willing to 
convict based on a confession even when the confession was coerced (Kassin & Wrightsman, 
1981), when the confession was provided by an informant with incentive to lie (Neuschatz, 
Lawson, Swanner, Meissner, & Neuschatz, 2008), or in total disregard of exculpatory DNA 
evidence (Appleby & Kassin, 2016).
One reason why jurors might fail to reject false confession evidence relates to the 
apparent low level of scrutiny afforded to confessions, in contrast to other types of evidence.  
There is some evidence that jurors tend to take confessions at face value, and do not treat 
confession evidence with the same level of scepticism and scrutiny as they would when 
assessing the quality and motives of witness or victim testimony (Malloy & Lamb, 2010; 
Palmer et al., 2016; Redlich, Ghetti, & Quas, 2008; Woestehoff & Meissner, 2016).  In an 
overview of the way in which jurors process different evidence types, Malloy and Lamb 

































































(2010) observed that jurors often ignore the same type of inconsistencies in confession 
evidence that would have caused them to believe the testimony lacking in credibility and 
reliability had it come from an eyewitness (e.g., Berman, Narby, & Cutler, 1995).  This could 
be because inconsistencies are often interpreted as deceit, such as in the case of a witness 
who changes their story over time (Malloy & Lamb, 2010), and can reduce the credibility of 
that witness. However, inconsistencies in confessions present a more complicated picture as 
there is no obvious benefit for an innocent person to confess, and may therefore act to reduce 
perceptions of guilt.  
However, recent research (Alceste, Crozier, & Strange, 2019; Henderson & Levett, 
2016; Eric Jones, Bandy, & Palmer Jr, 2019; Palmer et al., 2016; Woestehoff & Meissner, 
2016) suggests that jurors pay more attention to confession inconsistencies than wrongful 
conviction statistics might suggest. These studies show that some inconsistencies in 
confession evidence do indeed reduce perceptions of guilt of the confessor. For example, 
Palmer et al. (2016) had participants in a mock-juror study read materials that included a 
confession statement of a suspect admitting to armed robbery.  The confession was 
manipulated to be factually consistent or inconsistent with the facts of the crime, and 
participants were either provided with an alternate reason why the suspect might have 
confessed (police coercion, or to protect someone), or no alternate reason was provided.  
Participants who read a confession statement inconsistent with the facts of the crime were 
less likely to give a guilty verdict than those who read a confession statement that factually 
matched information about the crime.  This result was found whether a plausible alternate 
explanation for the suspect’s confession was made salient to the juror or not.  These findings 
indicate that some circumstances may motivate jurors to generate their own reason why the 
suspect has confessed, despite the general belief that jurors fail to scrutinise confession 
veracity.

































































Alceste et al., 2019 similarly tested the effect of inconsistencies and alternate reasons 
for confessions on perception of suspect guilt. They found that inconsistent confessions, and 
those where key crime information was provided by the interrogator rather than the suspect, 
influenced belief in the presence of an alternate reason for the confession (such as coercion).  
The findings of Alceste et al., 2019 and Palmer et al., 2016 show that participants are willing 
to attribute confessions to a reason other than guilt.  However, these studies do not explicitly 
test if this effect is still present when no salient reason is provided to participants.  The 
present study aims to investigate the capacity of jurors to generate their own alternate 
explanations for an inconsistent confession, and how this might influence belief in suspect 
guilt.  Addressing this gap in the literature will help further understanding of some of the 
conditions that determine when—and how—different confession inconsistencies affect belief 
in suspect guilt. 
Theoretical rationale
Previous research suggests that the likelihood of jurors generating alternative 
explanations for why a suspect confessed (other than because the suspect was guilty) may 
play an important role in explaining why inconsistencies in confessions reduce jurors’ 
perceptions of guilt in some situations but not others (Alceste et al., 2019; Palmer et al., 2016; 
Woestehoff & Meissner, 2016).  One reason why confessions are extremely persuasive of 
guilt relates to the correspondence bias (e.g. Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Ross, 1977). Jurors 
tend to attribute confessions to internal factors (i.e., guilt) rather than external factors, such as 
situational pressures associated with police interrogations (e.g., Kassin, 2012; Woestehoff & 
Meissner, 2016). The correspondence bias is especially likely to affect jurors’ processing of 
confessions because it is exacerbated for behaviors that are not self-serving, such as 
confessing to a crime (e.g. Edward Jones & Davis, 1965; Kassin, 2012; Kelley, 1973). 

































































Crucially, observers are less likely to attribute behaviors to internal factors when there 
is a salient alternative explanation for the behavior (Fein, McCloskey, & Tomlinson, 1997; 
Fein, Morgan, Norton, & Sommers, 2010; Kelley, 1973). Thus, if jurors are able to think of a 
plausible, alternative reason why a person has confessed (other than being guilty of the 
crime), they will be less likely to attribute the confession to guilt rather than some other cause 
(e.g., the suspect was protecting the real perpetrator, or was pressured by police to confess). 
The story model of juror decision making (Pennington & Hastie, 1992) is particularly 
relevant in this context, as it proposes that jurors create a cohesive narrative as the trial 
unfolds, and that this narrative is necessarily adaptable to accommodate new or conflicting 
evidence.  The story model may then provide some foundation for the idea that, when faced 
with an inconsistent confession, some jurors generate an alternate explanation as to why the 
suspect has confessed in order to fill a gap in the narrative created by the loss of the 
confession as a valid piece of evidence.
Based on this reasoning, we investigated whether the effect of inconsistencies on 
peoples’ belief in guilt depends on the extent to which inconsistencies prompt people to 
generate a plausible alternative explanation for why the suspect confessed. We hypothesized 
that the generation of alternative explanations for the confession would mediate the effect of 
inconsistencies on belief in guilt. That is, that the presence of inconsistencies would influence 
the generation of plausible alternative explanations for the confession (i.e., reasons other than 
guilt as to why the person confessed) which, in turn, would reduce belief in guilt ratings.
In the context of this broad aim, we addressed two additional issues. First, we tested 
whether different types of confession inconsistencies (contradictions vs factual errors) 
differed in the extent to which they prompted people to generate alternate explanations and, 
hence, the extent to which they influenced belief in guilt.  Factual errors involve the suspect 
making statements that are independently refuted by a piece of verified evidence, such as a 

































































police report of the facts of the crime, or photographs of the crime scene.  Contradictions 
occur when the suspect seems to forget the facts of their own story and must correct 
themselves in order to keep the story coherent.  The latter are in line with Brewer and 
Hupfeld’s (2004) definition of the inconsistency being due to distraction rather than error.  
In two decision-making experiments, we compared consistent confession evidence 
with evidence containing either contradictions (Experiment 1), or factual errors (Experiment 
2). Transcripts for the two experiments contained confession inconsistencies that focused 
around key aspects of the crime, including time and place, rather than peripheral aspects 
which jurors might see as inconsequential when determining the suspect’s guilt.  If some 
types of inconsistencies are more likely to facilitate generation of alternate explanations, this 
could contribute to the variable effects of inconsistencies on the persuasiveness of confession 
evidence reported in the literature. For example, contradictions might be viewed as natural 
irregularities in the confession story that simply reflect harmless imperfections in the 
confessor’s memory or recounting of the crime. If this is the case, contradictions might not 
trigger any concerns about the confession or prompt the jurors to consider any alternative 
explanation—other than guilt—for why the confession was made. In contrast, factual errors 
could be perceived as indicating serious problems with the credibility of a confession (e.g., 
“If the person was really there, surely they would not have got that detail wrong?”). Hence, 
factual errors might prompt jurors to consider alternative explanations for the confession 
which, in turn, could reduce perceptions of guilt. To the extent that this reasoning holds true, 
factual errors—but not contradictions—would increase the likelihood of jurors generating a 
plausible alternate explanation for the confession.
Recent research by Jones et al. (2019) is consistent with part of our contemplation of 
how jurors might process confession evidence. Jones et al. found that factual errors in a 
confession led to mock-jurors giving reduced judgments of the probable guilt of the 

































































confessor.  Although the authors did not measure the generation of alternative explanations 
for why the defendant confessed, they did find that factual errors increased perceptions that 
the confession was coerced, and of the likely guilt of an accomplice. Jones et al. suggested 
that these findings might indicate that mock-jurors thought the defendant was confessing to 
cover for the accomplice; this would amount to generating an alternative explanation for the 
confession.  While speculative, Jones et al.’s interpretation of results is consistent with our 
own hypotheses about the role of juror-generated alternate explanations in response to 
inconsistent confession information. We tested the hypothesis explicitly by comparing 
consistent confession evidence with evidence that contained contradictions (Experiment 1) or 
factual errors (Experiment 2) and measuring the extent to which each type of inconsistency 
prompted the generation of alternative explanations for the confession.
Second, we considered the specific mechanism by which the generation of alternative 
explanations might translate to differences in guilt ratings. One possibility is that this effect 
hinges on the number of alternative explanations generated. That is, the greater the number of 
reasons a juror can think of (other than guilt) for why the suspect confessed, the lower the 
perception of guilt. Another possibility is that the effect is reliant on the subjective 
plausibility of the best alternative explanation, rather than the number of explanations 
generated. That is, regardless of how many alternative explanations a juror generates, belief 
in guilt will depend on the extent to which at least one highly plausible explanation is 
generated—the greater the plausibility of the best explanation, the lower the perception of 
guilt.  
The investigation of the role of plausibility of self-generated alternate explanations for 
a confession has, to our knowledge, not been studied previously, and is our key contribution 
to the literature.  Previous literature has addressed different variables that might act as 
alternative explanations for a confession, such as coercion (e.g. Jones et al., 2019; Palmer et 

































































al., 2016; Henderson & Levett, 2016), and whether the interrogator or the suspect provided 
confession details (Alceste et al., 2019). However, these alternate explanations were provided 
to participants, and therefore did not explicitly test whether people are able to spontaneously 
generate their own explanations for a confession, and the subsequent role of plausibility of 
belief in those alternate explanations.
We designed a task to measure (1) the number of alternative explanations jurors could 
generate for why the suspect confessed, and (2) the plausibility of the best alternative 
explanation they generated. After providing a verdict (guilty or not guilty), participants were 
asked to list any other reasons why the suspect may have confessed (other than guilt). If the 
participant generated at least one alternate explanation for the confession, they were asked to 
choose the most plausible of their explanations and rate its plausibility.
Experiment 1: Contradictions
Experiment 1 investigated whether inconsistencies in the form of contradictions (e.g., 
Brewer & Hupfeld, 2004) would prompt the generation of alternate explanations for why a 
suspect confessed that would then, in turn, influence belief in guilt. If contradictions in 
confession evidence increase the likelihood of generating a plausible alternate explanation, 
belief in guilt should be reduced.
Method
Materials and data from Experiments 1 and 2 are available from the authors on 
request.
Participants
Seventy-three participants (53 female) were recruited from undergraduate psychology 
courses in return for partial course credit.  Participant ages ranged from 18 to 60 years (M = 
27.47, SD = 11.17), and were either reimbursed AUD$15, or received partial course credit.  

































































Design and procedure  
Informed consent was obtained prior to random allocation of participants to one of 
two conditions (consistent, contradictions) of a between-groups design. Supervised testing 
took place in groups (n = 2 - 12) in a laboratory or classroom setting.  After giving informed 
consent, participants read a confession interview transcript and then completed a pen-and-
paper questionnaire, with instructions not to change their answers once given.  In order to 
understand the effect of confession inconsistencies on individual belief in guilt, rather than as 
an indication of how jurors would actually vote post-deliberation, participants acted as 
individuals, rather than as part of a juror deliberation exercise.  Testing took approximately 
25 minutes.
Transcript
 The stimulus material was a (fictional) transcript of a police interview in which a 
suspect confessed to a physical assault charge.  A fact-finding police interview (as per the 
PEACE model) was used in preference to a guilt-presumptive interrogation (such as the Reid 
technique) to avoid introducing coercion as an experimental artefact.   At the start of the 
interview, it is stated that the suspect has previously spoken to the police, but that a new 
officer has taken over the case and wants to hear the suspect’s story from the start: “I’m just 
going to put your original statement aside for the moment, and give you the chance to start 
again from the beginning”.  In the consistent condition the suspect does not make any mis-
steps in his story, and the police officer does not query the consistency of his account of the 
crime.  In contrast, in the contradictions condition consistency was manipulated by having 
the suspect contradict the details from his previous statement on five key facts: 1) time the 
crime took place, 2) point of entry, 3) movements within the house, 4) injuries to the victim, 
and 5) whether he moved the victim or not. The contradictions between the suspect’s current 
statement and the alluded-to previous statement, are pointed out by the police officer, forcing 

































































the suspect to backtrack and amend his story to fit with his previously given statement.  For 
example, the suspect stated that he entered the victim’s house through an unlocked garage 
door.  When the police officer asked if that agrees with his previous statement, the suspect 
responded, “No, that’s right.  It was the other way round.  I got into the house by the front 
door, but I left through the garage.” The suspect offers no clear reason as to why he makes 
these mistakes.
Measures
Participants were asked a number of case-related questions, including whether they 
believed the suspect guilty or not guilty of the assault charge (verdict), and how confident 
they were in their decision, from 1 (“not at all confident”) to 10 (“totally confident”).   
Verdict and verdict confidence were combined to form a new dependent variable, called 
‘belief in guilt’, following the method outlined by Tenney, MacCoun, Spellman, and Hastie 
(2007). A value of 0.5 was added to each confidence score, and the scores for “not guilty” 
verdicts were multiplied by -1 resulting in a range of scores from -9.5 (completely confident 
in a not guilty verdict) to 9.5 (completely confident in a guilty verdict), with the 0.5 
difference reflecting that the original confidence scale ran from 1 to 10, rather than 0 to 10.  
For example, a guilty verdict with a confidence rating of 4 became a belief in guilt of 3.5, 
while a not guilty verdict with a confidence rating of 8 became a belief in guilt of -7.5.
Manipulation checks of consistency and coercion asked participants to rate on a 10-
point scale how consistent they found the suspect’s evidence (very inconsistent, to totally 
consistent), and how voluntary they believed the suspect’s confession to be (totally 
involuntary, to totally voluntary).  Demographic information included age, gender, languages 
spoken at home, and whether the participant was studying at university full or part-time.  

































































Alternate explanations and plausibility ratings.
The questionnaire included a measure of participants’ ability to generate plausible 
alternate explanations for why the defendant confessed. This took part in two stages.  First, 
participants were asked to imagine that the suspect was innocent of the confessed crime and 
list any reasons why the suspect might have confessed. For example, participant-generated 
explanations included, “If he did something worse and was using this as an alibi”, and 
“Could be covering up for a mate or brother”. Second, participants were asked to rate their 
preferred alternate explanation (if they gave one) as to how convincing they thought that 
reason was in explaining why the suspect confessed (on a scale of 0% - this reason is not at 
all convincing, to 100% - this reason is totally convincing). The score from the favored 
explanation was used as a measure of the extent to which participants were able to generate a 
plausible alternate explanation (other than guilt) for why the suspect confessed. Participants 




The consistency manipulation check confirmed that participants were able to discern 
the inconsistencies in the confession transcript. Participants rated a consistent confession as 
significantly more consistent than a contradictory confession, t (66.93) = 9.71, p <.001, 95% 
CI [3.37, 5.11], d = 2.27.  A manipulation check of perceived confession voluntariness 
showed little difference in perceived voluntariness between the consistent and contradictions 
conditions, t < 1, d =.07 (see Table 1 for means, standard deviations and 95% confidence 
intervals around the means for Experiment 1 measures).

































































Generation of alternate explanations
There was no significant difference in the number of alternate explanations generated 
between the consistent and contradictions conditions, t < 1, d = .17.  Participants who read a 
consistent confession gave similar plausibility ratings for their favored alternate explanation 
to those who read a contradictory confession, t < 1, d = .12. 
Belief in guilt
An independent samples t-test revealed no effect of consistency on belief in guilt, t < 
1, d = 0.08.  Participants in both conditions overwhelmingly judged the suspect to be guilty of 
the confessed crime.
Dichotomous verdicts of guilt
Overall, 90.4% of participants believed the suspect was guilty.  There was no 
significant difference in guilty verdicts between those in the consistent (93.5% guilty) and the 
contradictions conditions (88.1% guilty), n = 73, χ2 (1) = .612, p = .43.
[Table 1 near here]
Discussion
Experiment 1 results indicate that while jurors were aware of contradictions in a 
confession, these contradictions were not sufficient to reduce belief in guilt.  More 
specifically, jurors may perceive that the suspect is presenting a contradictory confession for 
reasons other than innocence.  For example, if the suspect changes their story, or stumbles 
over key facts, this may be interpreted as an understandable imperfection in the retelling of a 
story, rather than a problem suggestive of the suspect’s innocence and subsequent fabrication 
of a confession to escape the pressure of interrogation.

































































Experiment 2: Factual Errors
Experiment 2 tested whether factual errors in a confession (e.g., Jones et al., 2019) 
would prompt participants to generate plausible alternate explanations for the confession and, 
in turn, reduce their belief in the suspect’s guilt. 
Method
Participants and design
Eighty-nine participants (60 female) were recruited from undergraduate courses, and 
the wider university community.  Participants were aged between 18 and 61 years (M = 
27.19, SD = 10.44), and were either reimbursed AUD$15, or received partial course credit.  
Design and procedure
Design and procedure are as per Experiment 1, with the exception that participants in 
Experiment 2 were allocated to either the factual errors, or consistent conditions of a 
between-groups design. 
Materials
The confession transcript closely follows that of Experiment 1, though the reference 
to the suspect giving a statement previously was removed as this is not appropriate for 
Experiment 2.  
In this experiment, it was necessary to include a police report alongside both the 
consistent and inconsistent (factual errors) conditions to allow participants to check for 
accuracy themselves.  Unfortunately this meant that it was not possible to run Experiment 1 
and 2 concurrently by creating a three-groups design (i.e. consistent, contradictions, factual 
errors), as it was important that participants in Experiment 1 make their decisions about 
confession veracity based only on the information given by the suspect (whether consistently, 
or with contradictions), with no ability to fact check via a police statement. Had we included 

































































the police statement in all conditions (i.e. including the contradictions condition), this could 
have created the perception of factual errors between the police statement and the confession, 
rather than restricting the participant to the suspect’s intra-confession inconsistencies.  
Therefore, to avoid confounding our two different manipulations, Experiments 1 and 2 were 
run separately.
Experiment 2 participants in the consistent condition read a confession transcript that 
matched the police report on all key facts.  In the factual errors condition, the transcript 
deviated from the police report on five key facts: 1) the time of the assault, 2) location of 
injury, 2) location where the assault took place, 3) point of entry to the house, and 4) location 
of the victim.  Given that Alceste et al., (2019) found that the source of the confession detail 
could alter how participants perceived the veracity of confession, it is important to note that 
in Experiment 2 the suspect provides all of the key confession details (and subsequent errors), 
rather than the interviewing officers.
Measures
Measures were the same as for Experiment 1.
Results and discussion
Manipulation checks
Confession consistency was successfully manipulated, with participants rating a 
consistent confession rating as more consistent than a confession containing factual errors, t 
(75.343) = 10.00, p < .001, d = 2.11.  There was no significant difference between conditions 
on the manipulation of voluntariness, t (87) = 1.30, p = .197, indicating that the manipulation 
did not inadvertently affect perceived voluntariness of the confession (see Table 2 for means, 
standard deviations and 95% confidence intervals around the means for Experiment 2 
measures).

































































Dichotomous verdicts of guilt
Overall, 69.7% of participants believed the suspect to be guilty.  Participants in the 
factual errors condition gave a significantly lower amount of guilty verdicts (51.1%), than 
those in the consistent condition (88.6%), n = 89, χ2 (1) = 14.823, p < .001. This result 
replicated the central result of Jones et al. (2019).
Belief in guilt
Consistent with Jones et al. (2019), an independent samples t-test revealed that 
participants who read a confession containing factual errors had a weaker belief in suspect 
guilt than did those who read a confession that was factually consistent with the police report, 
t(77.21) = 4.15, p < .001, d = 0.88.  Note that this effect of inconsistency of belief in suspect 
guilt was not found in Experiment 1 where confession inconsistencies took the form of 
contradictions. 
Generation of alternate explanations
The presence of factual errors affected belief in the plausibility of the favored 
alternate explanation, but not the number of alternate explanations generated.  Participants in 
the factual errors condition expressed significantly higher belief in the plausibility of their 
favored alternate explanation than those in the consistent condition, t (87) = -2.27, p = .025, d 
= .48.   However, there was no significant difference between conditions on the number of 
alternate explanations generated, t (87) = -.80, p = .427, d = .17.
We conducted a mediation analysis in order to investigate the mechanism by which 
confession inconsistency (in the form of factual errors) affected belief in guilt.  Mediation 
analysis, using PROCESS software (Hayes, 2013), confirmed that the effect of 
inconsistencies on belief in guilt was partially mediated by the plausibility of the favored 
alternate explanation for the suspect’s confession (see Fig. 2). The presence of factual errors 
increased ratings of the favored alternate explanation which, in turn, was associated with 

































































lower belief in guilt, B = -.047, p=.021, CI 95% [-.09, -.01].  Most importantly, there was an 
indirect effect of inconsistency on belief in guilt via differences in plausibility (B = -.72, [-
2.22, -.064]), showing that consistency affected belief in guilt by altering belief in the 
plausibility of the participant’s favoured alternate explanation for the confession.  The direct 
effect of inconsistency on belief in guilt (controlling for plausibility of favored alternate 
explanations) was statistically significant, indicating partial mediation.  
[Figure 1 near here]
Crucially, while the plausibility rating of favored alternate explanations had a 
significant mediating effect on belief in guilt, the number of alternate explanations generated 
did not, B = -.17, [-1.28, .12].  This indicates that a participant’s belief in the suspect’s guilt 
is not affected by the number of alternate explanations they can think of, but rather how 
strongly they believe that their favoured alternate explanation (e.g. that the suspect was 
covering for someone else) can adequately explain why the suspect might have confessed in 
the absence of guilt.  
[Table 2 near here]
General Discussion
In this research, we used psychological theory to examine whether individuals could 
discern the presence of inconsistencies in confession evidence, and if these inconsistencies 
then influenced their belief in the suspect’s guilt. This is an important issue because it can 
help us understand factors that shape the extent to which jurors are sceptical when evaluating 
confession evidence. The findings of these two experiments make several contributions to 
advancing our understanding of how and when confession inconsistencies influence belief in 
suspect guilt.
First, our results highlight a crucial mechanism by which errors in a confession reduce 
belief in guilt:  The extent to which the person judging the suspect’s guilt can generate a 

































































plausible explanation—other than guilt—for why the confession was made.  When 
inconsistencies in confession evidence prompted participants to generate alternate 
explanations for why the suspect confessed (e.g., that the suspect confessed to cover for the 
person who actually committed the crime), this translated to reduced perceptions of guilt. 
This finding is encouraging because it contradicts the correspondence bias that says that 
people are incapable of attributing confessions to anything other than internal reasons (i.e. 
guilt), and cannot imagine why an innocent person would confess to a crime they did not 
commit. However, in considering how correspondence bias might play a role in jurors’ 
processing of errors in confession evidence, one problem that arises is determining what 
specific target behavior the observers (i.e. jurors) are making attributions about. In confession 
research, it is usually jurors making attributions about the confession itself (e.g. Woestehoff 
& Meissner, 2016). However, when the confession contains errors, it is unclear whether the 
target behavior for making attributions is the confession or the errors themselves. There is no 
simple way of determining which is the target behavior, because the kinds of attributions 
made about the two behaviors (i.e. the confession, or the errors) are quite different. For 
example, if the confession is the target behavior and jurors are considering ‘why did this 
person confess to a crime?’, dispositional attributions are very likely to be negative (e.g., 
‘because they are evil, and they did it’). In contrast, if errors in the confession are the target 
behavior, jurors would be considering ‘why did this person make mistakes in their 
confession?’. In this case, dispositional attributions will likely be much less negative, e.g., 
‘their memory is poor’, or ‘maybe they lied about committing the crime’ (assuming that lying 
is viewed as less bad than committing a crime).
 While our study does not allow us to differentiate whether participant attributions are 
related specifically to either the confession or the errors in that confession, our findings do 
show that people are indeed capable of generating alternate explanations for why the suspect 

































































might have confessed (e.g., that the suspect was covering for someone else), and then using 
those explanations to alter their internal narrative of the crime and reduce their belief in the 
suspect’s guilt.  Second, our results show that the effect of inconsistencies on judgments if 
guilt varies depending on the nature of the inconsistencies. Replicating the results of Jones et 
al. (2019), factual errors in confession evidence were associated with lower ratings of guilt. 
In contrast, contradictions were not associated with lower guilt ratings. Importantly, these 
different types of inconsistencies differed not only in their effects on perceived guilt, but also 
in their effects on the generation of alternative explanations for the confession. The presence 
of factual errors increased the likelihood that participants would generate alternative 
explanations which, in turn, reduced judgments of guilt. In contrast, the presence of 
contradictions did not affect the generation of alternative explanations. Together, these results 
suggest that factual errors were treated by participants as indicators of a potentially 
problematic confession, whereas contradictions in confession evidence seem to have been 
disregarded as inconsequential. This difference might contribute to explaining why 
inconsistencies in confessions are sometimes—but not always—disregarded by jurors (e.g., 
Malloy & Lamb, 2010; Palmer et al., 2016).  However, it still cannot completely explain this 
issue, because there are numerous cases of false confessions containing clear factual errors.
Third, our data show that the number of alternate explanations generated does not 
matter.  Regardless of how many alternate explanations were generated, the extent to which 
inconsistencies translate to reduced belief in guilt depended on the generation of a single, 
plausible explanation. The more plausible this best alternative explanation was, the greater 
the reduction in perceived guilt of the defendant. This finding that competing alternative 
explanations did not have additive effects on belief in guilt may have implications for 
attribution-based theories of social judgment (e.g., Kelley, 1973; Fein et al., 1997). It is 
important to note that the effect of factual errors on belief in guilt was only partially mediated 

































































by differences in the plausibility of favored alternate explanations for why the suspect 
confessed. Future research might identify additional mechanisms that contribute to the 
relationship between confession inconsistencies and belief in guilt. Nevertheless, our results 
indicate that the generation of a single, plausible alternate explanation plays an important role 
in explaining this relationship.
Finally, our findings exclude two possible explanations for why jurors are poor at 
processing confession evidence. The first is that jurors simply do not notice confession 
inconsistencies in the way that they would if the testimony was from an eyewitness.  Similar 
to previous research (e.g. Alceste et al., 2019), participants in both experiments were 
consistently able to discern the inconsistencies present in confession evidence. The second 
explanation ruled out is that people are incapable of imagining why an innocent person would 
confess to a crime they did not commit.  Contrary to this view, our results showed that mock 
jurors are capable of generating alternate explanations for why the suspect might have 
confessed (e.g., that the suspect was covering for someone else), and then use those 
explanations to alter their internal narrative of the crime and reduce their belief in the 
suspect’s guilt (depending on the extent to which they generated a plausible alternate reason).
Limitations and future directions
We acknowledge that the evidence presented to mock-jurors in this research was 
much less complex than the entire body of evidence the jurors consider in many real cases. 
However, the aim of the methodology in present research was not to simulate the 
complexities of a real trial.  Nor do we claim to account for all possible mechanisms that 
determine whether a juror will accept or reject an inconsistent confession.  Rather, our 
purpose was to isolate one possible variable that might account for some of the variation in 
juror decisions about confession evidence (for detailed discussion of different methods used 
in juror decision research, see Bornstein, 1999; Kerr & Bray, 2005; Palmer, Horry, & Brewer, 

































































2011).  By removing the confession evidence from the noise of other trial evidence, we can 
test whether confession evidence alone holds the kind of courtroom power indicated by real 
cases.  Much as the majority of cases where a defendant who confessed will be found guilty, 
participants in Experiment 1 overwhelmingly believed the suspect to be guilty, regardless of 
how inconsistently the confession was given. However, in Experiment 2, we were able to 
show that participants who viewed inconsistent confessions that could be verified using a 
secondary source (the police report) had significantly reduced belief in guilt, with a nearly 
50:50 split between guilty/not guilty verdicts.  From this we can infer that although 
inconsistencies might make people concerned about the veracity of the confession, those 
concerns do not necessarily translate to a strong belief that the suspect is innocent.  
Therefore, while inconsistent eyewitness testimony might cause jurors to discount that 
witnesses’ evidence as unreliable, inconsistencies in confession evidence appear to create a 
similar effect on the discounting of evidence, albeit a smaller one. 
In line with previous studies (e.g., Jones et al., 2019; Palmer et al., 2016), the findings 
in Experiment 2 run counter to wrongful conviction cases in which juries erroneously 
accepted a false confession as proof of guilt, and indicate that individual jurors are capable of 
rejecting inconsistent confession evidence.  Aside from the complexity of the body of 
evidence considered by jurors in court, the way the confession itself is presented may play a 
role in shaping the way evidence is processed by jurors. In jury studies, single-page 
confession statements are often used, which preclude the juror from seeing any negotiation 
between the suspect and interviewing officers over factual details that might trigger suspicion 
about the confession’s veracity.  Multi-page transcripts, such as the one used in our studies, 
may further allow participants to see where inconsistencies arose and formulate hypotheses as 
to why the confession was inconsistent.  However, the argument for using one type of written 
stimulus over the other is not strong, as similar results have emerged across recent studies 

































































using transcripts and confession statements, suggesting that the effects of inconsistencies on 
judgments of guilt are robust to such variation in evidence materials.
Video-recorded confessions have been used to assess accuracy at detecting true versus 
false confessions (e.g. Kassin, Meissner, & Norwick, 2005), and the increasing use of video-
recording of interrogations raises the possibility that jurors might be asked to evaluate 
increasingly detailed confession evidence (e.g., by considering a recording or transcript of the 
entire interrogation procedure).  Although the present research used materials that were more 
detailed than a confession statement, other materials that more closely mimic evidence 
presented in some courtrooms, such as video-recordings or cross examination transcripts, 
would increase ecological validity in this type of study. Similarly, with regards to a realistic 
level of trial complexity, our study involved individuals making judgments based on a single 
police interview, rather than multiple pieces of competing evidence (e.g., opening statements; 
cross-examination) over a period of days.  Future research might use the approach utilised in 
other studies (Fein et al., 1997; Fein et al., 2010) where suspicion-raising and disambiguating 
evidence are sent separately to participants over a period of time to create a more complex 
and realistic set of stimulus materials.
The present study, along with previous research (Alceste et al., 2019; Henderson & 
Levett, 2016; Palmer et al., 2016; Woestehoff & Meissner, 2016), shows that individual 
jurors are capable of both noticing inconsistent confession information and, in some 
circumstances, reducing their belief in a suspect’s guilt due to decreased confidence in the 
veracity of the confession.  However, juries function as a collective, rather than as 
individuals, and future research should consider the way that dissenting jurors make verdict 
decisions based on inconsistent confession evidence.  As seen in the case of Pedro 
Hernandez, at one stage during the deliberations the verdict could have swung either way, 
although the trial ended with one holdout juror refusing to move from a not guilty verdict.  

































































Future research into the effects of deliberation would contribute to understanding why 
individual jurors are sometimes sceptical of inconsistent confessions, and yet juries are still 
convicting based on such evidence.
Finally, although this research helps us understand when and why jurors are 
sometimes sceptical about confessions that contain inconsistencies, it also raises a new 
question: How do we best use this knowledge to help jurors process confession evidence? 
Our research shows that generating a plausible alternative explanation for a confession can 
lead to reduced judgments of guilt. Such scepticism about the validity of an inconsistent 
confession might help avoid wrongful convictions in cases involving questionable confession 
evidence (e.g., confessions that contain errors or were obtained via coercion), but might 
impede justice in cases involving unproblematic confession evidence (e.g., a voluntary 
confession obtained under best investigative practices and accompanied by convincing 
corroborating evidence). Further research is needed to determine how to best equip jurors to 
be discerning in their evaluation of confession evidence.
Summary and Conclusions
These studies build on existing research into how jurors might process confession 
evidence, by systematically investigating contradictory findings of the effects of 
inconsistencies in confession evidence on belief in guilt (Malloy & Lamb, 2010; Palmer et 
al., 2016).  Specifically, our studies investigated the novel area of the effects of plausibility of 
self-generated alternate explanations for an inconsistent confession and found that plausibility 
played an important role in the relationship between confession inconsistencies and 
judgments of suspect guilt.  In line with recent research (Alceste et al., 2019; Henderson & 
Levett, 2016; Palmer et al., 2016; Woestehoff & Meissner, 2016), the findings of the present 
studies paint an optimistic view that jurors can be discerning when evaluating confession 
evidence, and extend our understanding of the mechanisms behind decisions about suspect 

































































guilt when that confession evidence is inconsistent. Our combined research concludes that 
although people are capable of scrutinizing confession evidence more closely than previously 
thought, not all types of inconsistencies will reduce perception of the suspect’s guilt. Similar 
to Woestehoff and Meissner (2016), participants in our studies showed both the capacity to 
identify problematic confessions, and to imagine why an innocent person might confess in 
that situation.  However, to sway belief in guilt, solid evidence was required in the form of 
factual errors, with contradictions proving too inconsequential to be of influence. Factual 
errors play a crucial role, because they prompt the consideration of alternative explanations 
for the confession which, in turn, can reduce perceptions of likely guilt. The promising notion 
of discerning jurors encourages continued investigation into the elements of confession 
evidence that might dissuade jurors from automatically accepting confessions and making a 
more considered assessment of their evidentiary value. 
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Means, standard deviations, and 95% confidence intervals for Experiment 1 measures
 n M (SD) 95% CI
Belief in Guilt
Consistent 31 5.83 (3.75) 4.45, 7.21
Contradictions 42 5.49 (4.23) 4.17, 6.81
Perception of Consistency *
Consistent 29 7.94 (1.50) 7.37, 8.51
Contradictions 39 3.71 (2.10) 3.03, 4.38
Perception of Voluntariness
Consistent 31 7.06 (1.97) 6.33, 7.78
Contradictions 42 6.92 (1.98) 6.30, 7.53
No. of alternate explanations
Consistent 31 1.71 (1.66) 1.10, 2.32
Contradictions 42 1.45 (1.48) .99, 1.92
Plausibility of favored alternate explanation
Consistent 30 43.27 (29.94) 32.09, 54.45
Contradictions 42 39.86 (26.57) 31.58, 48.14
Note. * indicates significant difference between group means


































































Means and standard deviations for Experiment 2 measures
 n M (SD) 95% CI
Belief in Guilt *
Consistent 44 5.58 (4.77) 4.23, 7.03
Factual Errors 45 .27 (7.10) -1.87, 2.40
Perception of Consistency *
Consistent 44 7.72 (1.54) 7.25, 8.18
Factual Errors 45 3.47 (2.39) 2.75, 4.19
Perception of Voluntariness
Consistent 44 7.46 (2.30) 6.76, 8.15
Factual Errors 45 6.80 (2.45) 6.06, 7.54
No. of alternate explanations
Consistent 44 1.32 (1.65) .82, 1.82
Factual Errors 45 1.58 (1.41) 1.16, 2.00
Plausibility of favored alternate explanation*
Consistent 44 30.36 (34.16) 19.98, 40.75
Factual Errors 45 45.76 (29.60) 36.86, 54.65
Note. 95% CI = 95% confidence intervals, * = significant difference between group means


































































Figure 1. The effect of confession inconsistency on belief in guilt, mediated by belief in a 
self-generated alternate explanation for the confession (other than guilt) in Experiment 2. * 
≤.05, **≤.01, ***≤.001

































































Figure 1. The effect of confession inconsistency on belief in guilt, mediated by belief in a 
self-generated alternate explanation for the confession (other than guilt) in Experiment 2.
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